# Global Climate Governance in the Age of Geo-Economics **Date de l'événement :** 01/11/2025 * Publié le 01/11/2025 ### Date 01/11/2025 ## Chapô **As investment shifts away from decarbonisation towards military spending, global climate governance, embodied by the climate change, COPs must be reformed. The focus should be on implementing its objectives rather than on negotiation, and on strengthening mobilisation of non-state actors. Above all, climate governance must forge closer links between climate action, global trade, finance, industry and innovation through robust and equitable carbon pricing, and trade and investment partnerships focused on decarbonisation.** ## Corps du texte Global climate governance is under threat. The proliferation of conflicts is diverting investment away from the energy transition and decarbonisation towards military spending. Trade wars are fragmenting global markets along new geopolitical fault lines, turning interdependence into a weapon rather than a tool for efficiency. In addition to these external pressures, which are unlikely to ease any time soon, internal threats, particularly the rise of nationalism, are also undermining international cooperation on which climate action depends to achieve the carbon neutrality target set in the Paris Agreement. Successes and limitations of the Paris Agreement ------------------------------------------------ The Paris Agreement, concluded at the twenty-first Conference of the Parties (COP 21) in 2015, has had significant and concrete effects. The commitments made by countries have reduced the projections foreseen for global warming by the end of the 21st century from 3.6°C to 2.7°C, with a further reduction to 2.1°C at COP26 in 2021, provided, of course, that all the commitments made under this agreement are honoured. The agreement made the complete decarbonisation of the global economy a common goal for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, prompting a wave of commitments to carbon neutrality – that is, the ‘net zero emissions trajectory’ by 2050, which would limit global warming to 1.5°C. It has promoted the implementation of climate and development plans by 2030 through nationally determined contributions (NDCs), providing a framework for low-carbon investments. It reoriented the energy sector towards renewable technologies at the expense of fossil fuels: investment in the latter dipped from USD 1.5 trillion in 2015 to USD 1.2 trillion in 2024, while investment in low- and zero-carbon energy increased significantly from USD 1.2 trillion in 2015 to USD 2 trillion in 2024. Towards climate governance reform --------------------------------- Nevertheless, the Paris Agreement remains insufficient to achieve the emission reductions necessary by 2030 in order to reach carbon neutrality by 2050: the gap between NDC targets for 2030 and the net-zero emissions trajectory is estimated at 14 gigatonnes of carbon for limiting warming to 2°C, and 22 gigatonnes for limiting it to 1.5°C. Furthermore, global climate governance has changed little since the adoption, at COP24 in Katowice in 2018, of the Paris Rulebook, which aims to make countries' commitments transparent, equitable and measurable. The rulebook needs to be reformed, as the goals and context of this governance have changed. > _USD 2 trillions were invested in low- and zero-carbon technology in 2024, compared to USD 1.5 trillion in 2015._  > _USD 1.2 trillion were invested in fossil fuels in 2024, compared to USD 1.5 trillion in 2015._  Several avenues for reflection are worth exploring. Thus far, global climate governance has been particularly useful in setting new targets, but it has struggled to create the conditions for their implementation and to design effective incentives. Bridging the gap between ambition and action must now be the priority. This requires rethinking the system, its incentives and its relationship with global trade and financial frameworks. New ways of mobilising the private sector are also needed. Governance must adapt to a geopolitical and geo-economic context where economic security and sovereignty are now paramount. A three-pronged approach could achieve this. First, the logic on which the decision-making body of the Convention on Climate Change (the COP) is based must be reversed in order to prioritise implementation. Second, the transparency and accountability of the Action Agenda (see below), which is a tool for mobilising non-state actors, must be strengthened. Third, closer links must be forged between climate action, global trade, finance, industry and innovation. > **_Action Agenda_** > _Created in 2014, the Action Agenda brings together climate change initiatives from states and non-state actors of all sizes and types (businesses, investors, cities and local authorities). These actors exchange ideas, make commitments and develop solutions with the common goal of achieving the objectives of the 2015 Paris Agreement. The 2016 Marrakesh Partnership for Global Climate Action defined the current organisation of the Action Agenda._ Reversing the logic of the COPs ------------------------------- The organisation of COPs must fundamentally change. Negotiations currently dominate, while discussions on implementation are relegated to the background, within the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), which is responsible for ensuring effective implementation and follow-up for decisions made at the COPs. This logic needs to be reversed. While it made sense to prioritise negotiations until the Paris Rulebook was finalised, the focus must now be on achieving objectives. Transforming COPs into drivers of concrete action requires a change in actors, rather than just a change in priorities. Today, it is the negotiators who lead the work of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, resulting in politicised discussions that are disconnected from the realities on the ground and lack the technical expertise needed to overcome obstacles. Upcoming COPs should include policymakers from relevant ministries (energy, transport, construction, industry, agriculture) and, above all, from the ministries responsible for finance and central banks. The consensus rule, whereby COP decisions must be taken without any formal objection from any of the parties, also significantly reduces their effectiveness. While it made sense when defining common global goals, it is now a major obstacle to their implementation. Those who oppose faster climate action use it as a means of slowing down or even blocking the process. Ironically, changing the rules governing the COPs requires a consensus decision. Rather than trying to simplify or streamline procedures, which is unlikely to happen, successive COP presidencies should use their discretionary power to promote climate action. They could create an implementation forum bringing together sector policymakers, finance ministries, central banks, businesses, investors, cities and local authorities, with the goal of removing the obstacles that hinder the implementation of concrete measures. Strengthening the transparency and accountability of the Action Agenda ---------------------------------------------------------------------- The creation of the Action Agenda by the Paris Agreement introduced an important innovation in global climate governance. It resulted from an analysis of the reasons for the failure of COP15 in 2009 in Copenhagen, where governments were too cautious in setting climate targets, underestimating the innovative potential of low- and zero-carbon technologies and overestimating the costs of investing in decarbonisation. In Paris, the commitment of non-state actors, who often take more ambitious action than governments, helped to change these calculations and expectations and achieve more significant results. COP26 and COP28 further strengthened their role by creating the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net-Zero, a coalition of financial institutions (asset owners and managers, banks, insurers, pension funds) committed to carbon neutrality, and by encouraging and legitimising initiatives from the United Nations' Race to Zero campaign (see below). > **_Race to Zero_** > _The global Race to Zero campaign was launched by the United Nations in 2020, targeting non-state actors – companies, cities, regions, financial and educational institutions, etc. – to encourage them to take drastic and immediate action to help halve global emissions by 2030._ However, the lack of transparent monitoring has led to accusations of greenwashing, which are partly justified. Ten years after the Paris COP, it remains virtually impossible to evaluate the 500 initiatives launched since then. Peer review, rather than independent monitoring, creates conflicts of interest that undermine the credibility of the Action Agenda. An audit should be conducted to identify initiatives that are transparent and accountable, align them with the global balance sheet and NDCs, and abandon ones that do not meet these requirements. Future COPs could supplement the Paris Agreement by negotiating protocols on specific topics. Methane is the best example of this. Reducing this gas, which has a high global warming potential – eighty times greater than carbon dioxide over twenty years and twenty-five times greater over a hundred years – is a priority. This is easier in the energy, industry and waste sectors than in agriculture and livestock farming, where emissions are more diffuse and therefore very complex to assess and control. A dedicated protocol based on the Global Methane Pledge would be particularly useful in transforming voluntary commitments into regulations. Like the Montreal Protocol on the reduction of ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons and hydrofluorocarbons, this would reduce methane emissions and prevent up to 0.5°C of warming. Such a protocol would provide transparency, monitoring and verification, elements that are currently lacking in the Global Methane Pledge. It would have a positive impact on temperature projections and gain valuable time for the energy transition. This approach could be extended to other super-pollutants and gradually incorporate methane emissions from agriculture and livestock farming. Forging links between climate, trade and investment --------------------------------------------------- Although necessary, COP reform and transparency in the Action Agenda are only relatively minor adjustments given the challenges that the geopolitical and geo-economic context poses to global climate governance. Since Donald Trump's return to the White House in January 2025, this context has been marked by the second withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement, his administration's massive support for fossil fuels and the systematic dismantling of Biden-era policies. Other key factors include the fragmentation of global markets, supply chain disruptions, the decoupling of the United States and China, and friendshoring (the practice of companies manufacturing or sourcing from geopolitical allies). The current primacy of geopolitics over economics is detrimental to climate action. As the International Energy Agency (IEA) points out, the lack of international cooperation leads to a loss of economies of scale, competitiveness issues and less effective research, raising the risk of achieving carbon neutrality closer to 2090 than 2050. Realism dictates that alternative strategies must be identified. Two complementary approaches are available: the creation of carbon pricing clubs and commercial and investment partnerships. Creating carbon pricing clubs ----------------------------- Carbon pricing is an essential tool for achieving deep decarbonisation, alongside standards and public investment in clean technologies. A robust carbon price sends a clear signal, as it encourages innovation and applies the principle that the polluter will pay. However, excessive price differences between countries create distortions. The most constrained companies may lose competitiveness and polluting industries may relocate, causing carbon leakage – in other words, emissions escape any regulation. To avoid this, the European Union plans to introduce a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) in 2026 that will apply a carbon cost to imports. To be truly effective, these mechanisms should be part of broader multilateral cooperation. The creation of carbon clubs could therefore prove useful, not as a protectionist measure, but as frameworks for cooperation. Unlike unilateral CBAMs, they would consist of common commitments and rules and would be based on mutual recognition of norms and standards, thereby reducing trade tensions. These frameworks could be adapted to different levels of development through multi-tiered pricing and use the revenues for national decarbonisation. Some of these revenues could finance climate action in developing countries, making the system fair and inclusive. Combined with CBAMs, carbon clubs would, under certain conditions, help reconcile climate ambition and economic equity, thus avoiding an environmental race to the bottom. Building trade and investment partnerships ------------------------------------------ A complementary strategy is the development of trade and investment partnerships for the energy transition and decarbonisation. Going beyond traditional free trade agreements, these partnerships should be dedicated frameworks centred on decarbonisation through a just and rapid transition. They should provide reliable and diversified access to critical materials (lithium, nickel, cobalt, etc.) and be transparent, environmentally friendly and mutually beneficial. In addition to access to materials, they should also catalyse local green industrialisation by supporting joint ventures, local content and technology transfers (solar panels, batteries, electrolysers, electric vehicles). The challenge is mutual resilience, co-development and value sharing, as opposed to competition for critical minerals, which gives producing countries more power and leverage in their negotiations with consuming countries. To succeed, this initiative would need to align trade, investment and financing. This includes development financing, the introduction of guarantees to reduce risks in emerging economies, and the establishment of blended finance instruments and green procurement commitments. The interoperability of green taxonomies could help unlock cross-border capital flows. Cooperation on carbon markets is more complex and calls for greater caution, as it raises the question of the permanence of emissions reductions. In short, this new-generation model must be based on co-investment, policy coherence and profound structural transformation beyond simple tariff reductions. Understanding supply and value chains ------------------------------------- Beyond geo-economic constraints, global decarbonisation contends with national objectives for green jobs, industrial policy and value chain capture. The prioritization of economic security by states seeking access to resources and strategic positioning partially undermines the cooperation needed for climate action. To paraphrase Clausewitz, climate action thus becomes the securing of supply chains by other means. Reconciling national industrial policies (resilience and economic sovereignty) with international cooperation (GHG emissions reduction and dependency management) requires us to understand the political economy of supply chains and strategic sectors, consisting of compromises, potential conflicts and opportunities for collaboration. Studying these issues is not simply an academic exercise, but a strategic imperative for adapting global climate governance to the realities of geo-economics. **References:** * Ellis, J., Geiges, A., Gonzales-Zuñiga, S., Hare, B. et al. 2024. ‘Warming Projections Global Update’, _Climate Action Tracker_, 14 November 2024, * McKenna, C., Ghosh, A., et _al_. 2022. _Integrity Matters. Net Zero Commitments by Businesses, Financial Institutions, Cities and Regions_. High-Level Expert Group on the Net Zero Emissions Commitments of Non-State Entities, * United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). 2024. _Emissions Gap Report 2024. No more Hot Air … Please! With a Massive Gap between Rhetoric and Reality, Countries Draft New Climate Commitment_, Nairobi: UNEP. **_This article was originally published in Conférence issue No. 4, titled "Facing the Environmental Challenge", a publication that sheds light on major contemporary issues and informs public and private decision makers._** ### Thématique `#Environnement` **Langue :** `#Anglais` --- ### Navigation pour IA - [Index de tous les contenus](https://conference.sciencespo.fr/llms.txt) - [Plan du site (Sitemap)](https://conference.sciencespo.fr/sitemap.xml) - [Retour à l'accueil](https://conference.sciencespo.fr/)