# Aftermath of the State Election in Saxony-Anhalt **Date de l'événement :** 15/09/2026 * Publié le 15/09/2026 ### Date 15/09/2026 ## Chapô **The AfD’s landslide victory in Saxony-Anhalt has reignited fears about the normalization of the far right in Germany, but the result is less surprising than it first appears. Ludwig Schulze, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Centre for European Studies and Comparative Politics at Sciences Po Paris, examines how the party has built a durable local presence, weakened the social stigma attached to voting for it, and positioned itself to shape the broader political agenda. Has the AfD itself become normalized among German voters and could the same soon happen to its more extremist ideas and policies?** ## Corps du texte Just over a week ago, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) won over 40% in the state election of Saxony-Anhalt, an East German state of around two million people, more than doubling its result from the last election in 2021. Since then, we have seen a surge in news articles, analyses, and opinion pieces across the Western world. Much of the it portrays the result as a shock, triggering disbelief over how a far-right party could have secured almost half of all seats in a German election. Dire as this may be, few observers should have been surprised by this outcome. The AfD was leading the polls for weeks with around 40% in a rural, aging, and small East German state that not only has a history of voting for far-right and fascist parties going back to the NSDAP, but is also generally characterized by weak partisan ties, where both voters and politicians have frequently changed their political affiliations over time. ### The AfD as a Brand Has Been Normalized Although the AfD's electoral list included a variety of radicals, conspiracy theorists, and aspirational fascists, it was headed by an uncharacteristically approachable candidate who many found sympathetic, in the person of Ulrich Siegmund. This presented a strong contrast to the highly unpopular German government of Chancellor Friedrich Merz, whose communication and policy responses to the multitude of international crises did not resonate with voters. His party, the CDU, received less than half of the votes it got in 2021. In other words, if there were a place and moment in time where the AfD could have secured such a breakthrough, the recent election in Saxony-Anhalt would be a strong candidate. Even though the result itself might be more surprising for some people than for others, an electoral result of over 40% of the votes naturally invokes further fears over the normalization of the far-right in Germany and beyond. This has been a prominent statement across many discussions, and yet it deserves further qualification. The electoral results of far-right parties in Germany and the Western world over at least the last decade make it hard to miss the far-right as an established political force. The AfD as a brand is therefore normalized in many parts of Germany. The stigma against far-right powers in post-WWII Germany has weakened to the extent that the social costs associated with supporting the AfD have shrunk within many social groups. While we can certainly point to the role of social media or of other parties adopting far-right positions to explain this trend, we also have to acknowledge the work the AfD itself does on the ground. Since partisan ties are notoriously weak across East Germany, mainstream parties often struggle to form a strong local base. In contrast, the AfD has managed to create a rather strong local presence. It is not unusual to meet members of the local AfD chapter advertising their party throughout the year across marketplaces in rural towns or at local cultural events, regardless of whether an election is coming up or not. The AfD, for example, has become known for organizing events around the East German moped "Simson," thereby celebrating the cultural legacy of the GDR. This constant exposure to the AfD, while other parties remain absent, has forged local ties and helped normalize it as a political brand. These local connections also help explain how the AfD managed to mobilize such large shares of former abstainers, leading to a remarkably strong overall turnout. ### Has the AfD’s Extremism Been Normalized Too?  While the AfD as a brand is normalized among many voters, it is not clear how much this is also the case for its xenophobic, nationalist, and fascist policies. It is true that neo-Nazis, conspiracy theorists, and ardent nationalists exist among the AfD electorate in Saxony-Anhalt and hold influential ties within the party itself. But it is doubtful whether they make up a majority of the over 40% of voters who turned out for the AfD. The results merely suggest that many voters either put more weight on elements of the AfD's platform other than its xenophobic ones or do not find the AfD's commitment to such policies credible enough. Nonetheless, just as the AfD as a brand has been normalized, it is not out of the question that the same could happen with its more extremist policy stances. As we know from the scholarship, the center-right CDU plays a major role in this process. Its response to a more radical approach to immigration or a push for a more nationalist cultural and education policy, can ultimately shape how many of the AfD's policy goals become normalized among the electorate. For example, while the jury is still out on this issue, who can assure us that a disorganized CDU faction in Saxony-Anhalt would not end up supporting intensified teaching about Bismarck at the expense of other parts of modern German history? While many might still have voted for the CDU because they disagree with the AfD's education policies, the CDU might hope to regain some AfD voters by promoting more nationalist education policies itself. ### The political Landscape in Saxony-Anhalt Remains in Disarray For now, the political landscape in Saxony-Anhalt remains in disarray. With over 40% of the votes, the AfD naturally derives the strongest claim to forming a new government. For that to materialize, however, the AfD would still need votes from a few other members of parliament. The ultimate enabler of an AfD government could end up being the BSW (Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht), which, after splitting from the far-left Die Linke in 2024, finds itself positioned along the left-authoritarian dimension with a strong affinity toward Russia. The BSW is a young party whose internal structures are not necessarily transparent and only marginally passed the 5% electoral threshold in the state election. Federal politicians seem to wield vast influence over how state-level BSW factions are supposed to behave, going so far that the BSW faction in the East German state of Thuringia recently decided to dissolve itself due to attempted interference from the federal party level. It is also not clear what their plan and strategy is in Saxony-Anhalt. While AfD and BSW share a common approach on issues such as Russia, immigration and on how position themselves toward the political establishment, there is little else that binds them. Although BSW politicians originally planned to abstain from voting on the formation of a new government so as to indirectly support the AfD, recent statements instead point to direct support for Ulrich Siegmund as the new governor of Saxony-Anhalt. Either way, the resulting government is unlikely to rest on a stable coalition, as it is anything but clear whether the BSW would continue supporting an AfD minority government or even join a coalition with it. ### After All, It Is not Even Clear Whether the AfD Wants to Govern Although we still need to consider the possibility of a couple of CDU politicians expressing support for an AfD government, the most likely scenario is an unstable AfD minority government that relies on votes from the BSW. It is not clear what consequences such an unstable government could entail. While some might hope that this allows voters to learn about the AfD's incompetence to govern, others might fear that it allows the AfD to present itself as the victim of a political landscape whose only goal is to sabotage it rather than improve the lives of its citizens. After all, it is not even clear whether the AfD actually wants to govern. To maximize its influence at the federal level, some AfD politicians might even have preferred that all other parties across the political spectrum unite and try to form their own anti-AfD government. Albeit rather unrealistic at the moment, such a coalition would hardly be able to pursue effective policies given various ideological disagreements. This would allow the AfD to present itself as the only real option for political change. So while the AfD celebrates its win in Saxony-Anhalt, it cares more about the long game at the federal level where it is trying to become the dominant party in the upcoming election.  In the meantime, two upcoming state elections in Berlin and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania will show how much the AfD can profit from its success in Saxony-Anhalt. Although we can expect the AfD to grow in Berlin as well, it will most likely end up in opposition. The AfD is certainly stronger in the north-eastern German state of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, but as of now we cannot tell whether the AfD or the incumbent Social Democrats will emerge as the winner of the election. ### Thématique `#Europe` **Licence :** `#CC-BY-ND (Attribution, Pas de modification)` **Langue :** `#Anglais` --- ### Navigation pour IA - [Index de tous les contenus](https://conference.sciencespo.fr/llms.txt) - [Plan du site (Sitemap)](https://conference.sciencespo.fr/sitemap.xml) - [Retour à l'accueil](https://conference.sciencespo.fr/)