# Climate, security, Canada: what Ursula von der Leyen's speech reveals about a European Union at a turning point **Date de l'événement :** 21/09/2026 * Publié le 21/09/2026 ### Date 21/09/2026 ## Chapô **Ursula von der Leyen's latest State of the Union address broke new ground on several fronts: explicitly linking the climate emergency to the political rentrée, offering Canada an unprecedented "associate member" status, and announcing a "European Security Council" to free the EU from its dependence on the United States. Do these announcements amount to mere communication strategy, or do they signal a deeper shift in European integration? A tenured professor and researcher at Sciences Po's Centre for History, a specialist in European affairs and author of [_L'Europe, un État qui s'ignore_](https://www.librairie-sciencespo.fr/livre/9782271120793-l-europe-un-etat-qui-s-ignore-sylvain-kahn/), Sylvain Kahn unpacks the geopolitical and institutional undercurrents of this unusual back-to-school address.** ## Corps du texte _**Ursula von der Leyen opened part of her speech by addressing the 2026 summer heatwaves, which caused 35,000 deaths in Europe, stating that such a summer "must never happen again." Is this explicit linking of the climate emergency to the political rentrée speech a first in the history of this annual exercise?**_ Yes. The State of the Union address, delivered by the President of the European Commission before the European Parliament since 2010, is by nature a political speech. It aims to mobilize the Members of the European Parliament who respond to it immediately afterward, European political parties, and European citizens. The goal is to demonstrate that a political life exists within the European Union, so that citizens become aware of it. Since Ursula von der Leyen took over the leadership of the Commission in 2019, there has been a clear intent to address European citizens — who are increasingly voting for radical protest parties — through issues that affect and mobilize them, in order to show that the European Union is them, and that the Union is acting on very concrete problems that matter to people. In this particular speech, several passages addressed the heatwave, wildfires, health, housing, and inequality. Strictly speaking, these issues are not at the core of European policy as defined by the Treaty on European Union. But this is also how the Union evolves. Since 1950, its competences have continuously expanded and deepened, and this becomes formalized legally through treaties that themselves evolve: the Treaty of Lisbon is a distant heir to the Treaty of Rome. The history of the European Union also shows that Europeans sometimes build new public policies together even when these are not provided for by the treaties. This was the case during the Covid response, when the Twenty-Seven (twenty-eight at the time) mobilized the European Commission and European funding to implement policies not foreseen by the treaties. This is exactly what Ursula von der Leyen is doing here. She is acknowledging that climate change is producing increasingly severe effects, and that it is up to Europeans, who collectively bear the consequences, to act together to anticipate the future heatwaves that science tells us are certain to come. _**Ursula von der Leyen announced her wish to make Canada the first "associate member" of the European Union, an unprecedented category in the history of European integration. Does this new status mark a shift in the EU's enlargement doctrine?**_ To properly understand the political — and indeed geopolitical — stakes, it is useful to consider together the speech given by President von der Leyen on Wednesday the 16th, in which she proposed that Canada become an "associate member," and the response delivered by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney on Thursday the 17th. The Canadian head of government was in fact invited to attend the State of the Union address and to respond to it. This is the first time that the head of government of a non-EU country has been granted such an invitation. Leaders of third countries had previously addressed the European Parliament, but none had ever before been invited to attend the Commission President's annual address and respond to it. To get a sense of what the expression "associate member" actually covers — an idea that is bound to evolve, since everything remains to be built — the two speeches must be considered together. For now, this expression does not correspond to any legal or institutional reality enshrined in the treaties. There are currently associated countries under the Eastern Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy, the regional policy through which the Union builds dense contractual relationships with bordering countries such as Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, or Moldova. These categories are indeed written into the treaties. And things do evolve: Ukraine and Moldova, for instance, initially associated countries, are now candidate countries for accession. The category of "associate member" therefore does not yet exist. For now, it is a political formula. The German government pointed this out as early as the following day, Thursday the 17th, calling the proposal interesting but suggesting that the term "associate member" was probably not the most suitable formula to describe what will be built with Canada. On the Canadian side, Mark Carney spoke, in his response speech, of a "strong alliance" and a "privileged partnership" — that is, a strengthening of ties — without adopting the expression "associate member" himself. For now, then, this was more an expression of intent and political project than a legal and institutional reality. Several sources in Brussels have also confirmed that very few actors — Commission departments, directors-general, other commissioners, member states' foreign ministers — were informed in advance of the announcement, and that the Canadian prime minister himself apparently did not know the President would use this term. This is, therefore, very much an exercise in political communication, where the choice is made to strike minds by launching a project. _**But beyond the semantic considerations and the announcement effects, could Canada one day genuinely join the European Union?**_ What is certain is that several political actors have openly raised the question, whether for communication purposes or because they genuinely consider it relevant. Canada's opposition leader, Pierre Poilievre, who narrowly lost the federal election to Mark Carney, reacted by stating, as I recall: "Canada will never become the 51st state of the United States, and it will never become the 28th member state of the European Union." This is not a marginal political figure speaking, but the leader of the opposition. From an academic standpoint, this question is worth asking for what it reveals. First, it reminds us that the European Union has, for seventy-five years, been built through voluntary accession and extension, not expansion. Second, it shows that the Union has, within this framework of voluntary extension, established a genuine territorial system: a dense network of very strong ties with numerous countries. The closest ties are, of course, those binding the member states together. But beyond that, the Union maintains very strong relations with Iceland, Norway, or Switzerland — nearly integrated through the European Economic Area — or with the associated countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood, already partly integrated into the Union on a legal level. If we look at so-called "trade" agreements — a term that is too narrow, since these agreements cover far more than trade, as with the recently signed Mercosur agreement, or CETA with Canada — we find that the intensity of legal, regulatory, commercial, and normative ties between the European Union and Canada under CETA is actually greater than those currently binding the European Union and the United Kingdom since Brexit, under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement. In a sense, Canada is today more integrated with the European Union than the United Kingdom is, despite the UK's already extensive ties. This illustrates the European Union's polarizing capacity: certain countries — one could also mention Japan, New Zealand, or South Korea — judge it advantageous, for their own reasons, to deepen their interdependence with it. In Canada's case, it is the threats of annexation voiced by Donald Trump that are pushing the current government to tighten ties with the European Union on trade, services, values, research, education, and industrial value chains. A strategic partnership was in fact signed between the EU and Canada in July 2025, complementing CETA, which has been in force since 2017. Along these lines, one could speculate that such a convergence of values and ways of life might eventually lead to Canada's accession to the European Union. But counterarguments exist in equal measure: the six thousand kilometres of ocean separating the two territories, Canada's size — comparable to, or even larger than, that of the European Union — or the fact that Canada, as a federal state, has differences between its provinces, particularly in trade and taxation, that are more pronounced than those between EU member states, which together form a single market. If Canadians have not even unified their own internal market between federated provinces, it is hard to imagine them integrating into a unified market governed by rules shared across several countries. So there are arguments on both sides. This is certainly not to suggest that this would be a first step toward Canadian accession to the Union: Mark Carney himself has repeatedly stated that this was pure speculation. What is interesting, however, is what the very fact that this question can be raised reveals about the European Union's geopolitical situation, its resilience, and its power of attraction. Human beings are creatures of narrative and language: as soon as an expression like "associate member" is uttered, the collective imagination seizes upon the question of a possible member-state status. In any case, this helps us better understand the nature of this European Union, which remains, above all, a voluntary political, cultural, and social construction — one characterized, for nearly a century, by extension rather than expansion, and by a supranationality that pools sovereignty rather than practising imperialism. _**Faced with hybrid threats and the rise of artificial intelligence, the President of the European Commission announced the creation of a "European Security Council." How should this declaration be understood?**_ The fact that the President of the European Commission is announcing an institutional initiative in the field of security fits both within the continuity of her previous speeches and within an evolution of the European Union underway since 2022 — that is, since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which led Europeans to take several initiatives in the field of defence. Until now, these initiatives have mainly concerned the defence industry and support for Ukraine, an associated country that finds itself invaded, rather than the defence of European territory itself. The latter has, for eight decades, been ensured by European countries within the framework of NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A defence alliance lasting nearly a century is a rare thing in the history of international relations, and this should be emphasized. Since the Cold War, Europeans have thus ensured the defence of their territory within an alliance with a more powerful partner: the United States of America. However, after the turning point of 2022, a second turning point came with the return to power, in 2025, of American President Donald Trump. As early as February 2025, barely a month into his term, the new American administration made clear — through the voice of Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, at a meeting in Brussels with its European allies — that Europeans should henceforth consider their conventional defence to be their own responsibility, and should no longer expect the United States to guarantee assistance under all circumstances. This trend has only been confirmed since, notably in the National Security Strategy published by the American administration in November 2025 (a document each president drafts at the start of their term), which makes clear that, for the United States, Europeans are no longer allies but a resource to be mobilized in the service of American national interest. We are no longer in a logic of mutual benefit or interdependence: the United States is displaying a desire for dominance over Europeans. It is in this context that Ms von der Leyen's announcement should be understood. The most important point, in my view, is the sentence that follows this announcement: she proposes implementing, at the European Union level, the equivalent of Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty — referred to here as an "emergency security protocol." It is worth recalling the distinction with Article 5 of NATO, the mutual defence clause: when a member country's territory is attacked, all other Alliance countries commit to coming to its aid by means they deem appropriate. Article 4, less well known but equally important, provides that when a member government believes the integrity of its territory, independence, or security is threatened, it can request a meeting of the NATO Council — that is, of permanent representatives, defence ministers, or foreign ministers of member countries — in order to formally alert its partners and take the necessary measures to prevent the threat from materializing. This mechanism has already been activated several times in NATO's history, including recently: Poland and Estonia invoked it in 2025, after being overflown by drones and Russian military aircraft. Ms von der Leyen's idea is simple: since the United States no longer considers Europeans to be allies, the latter can no longer safely and reliably count on the procedures provided for by NATO. Yet the territory of the European Union has been regularly threatened for two years by hybrid threats, including military-use drones, most likely sent or piloted by Russia. Europeans must therefore be able to consult one another, independently of the American position — at least, that is how I interpret this announcement. In concrete terms, any EU member state could thus request a meeting of the European Council or the Council of the European Union to alert its partners to threats identified on its territory — a mechanism that is not currently provided for by any treaty. It will be necessary to watch which texts are circulated and negotiated, since this presidential announcement implies that the European Commission will now propose the adoption of such a mechanism, which requires significant political, institutional, regulatory, and legislative work within the Union. I would not be surprised if the objective were to allow the President of the Commission herself to convene a meeting of the European Council — a prerogative that formally belongs today to the President of the European Council, currently former Portuguese Prime Minister António Costa. This would give her the ability to bring together the relevant ministers, the responsible commissioner, or even heads of government, to specifically address a security and defence matter. This is not about creating an entirely new mechanism. There already exists, within the Treaty on European Union, a standing security committee composed of permanent representatives — the ambassadors of the Twenty-Seven to the EU — accompanied by military officials, as well as several articles relating to the common security and defence policy. What Ms von der Leyen is proposing is rather a mechanism allowing Europeans to convene quickly and flexibly, without having to work around the policy of the American government, which has been unfavourable to them for the past year and a half. This may also, from her perspective, be a way of strengthening the Commission's coordinating and driving role, at a time when European security policy currently falls primarily to the European Council, and only secondarily to the Commission. It would thus amount to a streamlining aimed at gaining efficiency, at a time when threats demand increasingly rapid decisions. _**How might this future European Security Council interact with external partners, Canada specifically?**_ It must first be recalled that, for now, this is only an announcement: nothing has yet been concretely established. Everything will depend on how the Twenty-Seven respond, within the framework of the Council of the European Union (the chamber of states) and the European Council, which brings together heads of state and government. But if this new body were to come into being — allowing Europeans to meet among themselves, within the European Union, to address security and defence issues without regard to the American position — it would be entirely conceivable to occasionally invite heads of government or defence ministers from non-member countries, should Europeans consider it desirable. The strengthening of ties between Canada and the European Union is not, in fact, limited to trade: it also concerns artificial intelligence, energy and mineral resources, and could extend to defence. Canada is notably part of the coalition of the willing supporting Ukraine, a coalition initiated by the United Kingdom and France. One could thus imagine this European Security Council, should it come into being, occasionally inviting the Canadian prime minister or defence minister to certain of its meetings, depending on the urgency or the topics addressed. This mechanism would thus give Europeans the capacity to pursue a more strategically autonomous policy vis-à-vis the Americans. It could also correspond, from Ms von der Leyen's point of view, to a desire to strengthen the Commission's coordinating and driving role in a field — security policy — that today falls essentially to the European Council, and to streamline decision-making at a time when threats demand ever-greater responsiveness. **Further reading:** Sylvain Kahn, _Histoire de la construction de l'Europe depuis 1945_, coll. "Savoirs," Paris, PUF, 2021. Sylvain Kahn, "De quoi la Communauté politique européenne est-elle le nom ?," _Telos_, June 12, 2023. Available at: [https://www.telos-eu.com/fr/politique-francaise-et-internationale/de-quoi-la-communaute-politique-europeenne-est-elle-le-nom.html](https://www.telos-eu.com/fr/politique-francaise-et-internationale/de-quoi-la-communaute-politique-europeenne-est-elle-le-nom.html) ### Thématique `#Europe` **Langue :** `#Français` --- ### Navigation pour IA - [Index de tous les contenus](https://conference.sciencespo.fr/llms.txt) - [Plan du site (Sitemap)](https://conference.sciencespo.fr/sitemap.xml) - [Retour à l'accueil](https://conference.sciencespo.fr/)