# Russia-Iran: Anatomy of a Strategic Alignement **Date de l'événement :** 11/02/2026 * Publié le 11/02/2026 ### Date 10/02/2026 ## Chapô **In the face of Western pressure, Russia and Iran are displaying a convergence that is proving durable. Neither a formal military alliance, nor a simple marriage of convenience, this flexible relationship draws its strength from a shared perception of how external cooperation can become a tool for managing internal vulnerability. What is the true nature of this alignment that defies standard classification? Nicole Grajewski, Assistant Professor at CERI-Sciences Po, discusses in this interview the dynamics cementing this bond between Moscow and Tehran.** ## Corps du texte _**Based on your research, how should the Russo-Iranian relationship be conceptualized? Is it a strategic alliance in the classic sense of the term?**_ **Nicole Grajewski:** In my book [_Russia and Iran: Partners in Defiance from Syria to Ukraine_](https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/russia-and-iran/), I deliberately avoid labeling the Russo-Iranian relationship a strategic alliance in the classic sense. It is not an alliance comparable to NATO. There is no mutual defense commitment, no integrated command structure, and no obligation for automatic military intervention in the event of an attack. This relationship is deeper and more durable than a simple "partnership of convenience." It has demonstrated its resilience in the face of leadership changes, regional shocks, and real disagreements, suggesting it is a relationship more structured than _ad hoc_ coordination. I view it as a form of strategic alignment anchored in a shared perception of vulnerability, both internal and external. For years, Moscow and Tehran have been bound by overlapping threat narratives: the fear of Western pressure and containment, concerns regarding sanctions and isolation, and, above all, regime security anxieties fueled by the specter of domestic unrest. These shared threat perceptions do not mechanically generate cooperation, but they create a common interpretive framework that facilitates the maintenance and reactivation of this cooperation during crises. This is why the relationship sometimes appears latent or pragmatic, only to suddenly become highly operational at other times. It rests less on permanent commitments than on a lasting sense of shared exposure to similar risks. One of its important characteristics is a process of gradual and uneven institutionalization. Over time, Russia and Iran have developed a dense network of diplomatic, military, economic, and security channels that support cooperation even when political trust is limited. These mechanisms are often deliberately flexible and informal rather than codified, allowing both parties to hedge against risks while facilitating rapid coordination in a crisis. In this sense, institutionalization does not produce automatic commitments, but it reduces transaction costs, facilitates learning, and allows cooperation to intensify quickly when the perception of a shared threat becomes acute. Theoretically, this is also why I am cautious about exclusively using traditional alliance theory or balance-of-power models to explain this relationship. These frameworks are useful, but they tend to view bilateral ties as relatively static responses to variations in material power. The Russo-Iranian relationship is far more dynamic. It evolves through interaction, the sharing of operational experiences, and learning, and it is significantly shaped by domestic political concerns and regime security. _**You highlight that the alliance between Russia and Iran is primarily bonded by the fear of internal uprisings. How does this lens of "regime security" alter our understanding of their external actions, whether on the Ukrainian front, in Syria, or regarding the nuclear file?**_ **N.G**: Regime insecurity and the fear of domestic unrest have long been an essential glue in Russo-Iranian relations. One of my main arguments is that this common concern has generated not only parallel behaviors but also processes of learning and adaptation between the two regimes. Rather than viewing domestic politics and foreign policy as distinct domains, this logic of "regime security" shows how external cooperation becomes a tool for managing internal vulnerability. This dynamic is particularly visible in the wave of protests currently shaking Iran. Over time, Russia and Iran have exchanged experiences, practices, and technologies related to protest management, information control, and coercive stabilization. In my work, I demonstrate how this exchange has become systematized, notably because both regimes have come to view domestic unrest not as a purely internal problem, but as a phenomenon shaped by transnational information flows and external pressures. In this sense, cooperation on regime security is not an incidental aspect of the bilateral relationship; it is one of its most important dimensions. However, it was in Syria that this dynamic was implemented on a large scale. Neither Russia nor Iran was willing to accept the collapse of the Assad regime in 2011, especially after the fall of the Libyan dictatorship. But beyond the initial decision to intervene, it was the networks woven through sustained joint operations that proved most decisive. Syria required daily coordination between military forces, intelligence services, supply chains, and local Russian and Iranian partners. This resulted in an unprecedented level of interoperability and mutual knowledge. These networks have had considerable importance well beyond the Syrian theater. When Russia subsequently found itself in need of drones in Ukraine, the speed with which it turned to Iran and integrated Iranian systems reflected not only necessity but also pre-existing operational relations. The personnel knew each other, communication channels already existed, and adapting Iranian capabilities to Russian operational requirements had already been a valuable experience. In this sense, Syria served as a laboratory for military-technical cooperation capable of being repurposed in very different contexts. _**And what about the nuclear issue?**_ **N.G**: The nuclear issue follows a different logic. Russia has undoubtedly played the most important external role in Iran’s civil nuclear program, notably through the Bushehr nuclear power plant. For much of the post-Cold War period, Moscow sought to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon while using nuclear cooperation as leverage, particularly through fuel supply agreements and its diplomatic role in the Iranian nuclear dossier. This allowed Russia to present itself as a responsible actor within the non-proliferation regime while maintaining influence over Tehran. What changed after the war in Ukraine is not the technical foundation of this cooperation, but Russia’s political posture. As relations with the West deteriorated, Moscow became less willing to play a constraining intermediary role regarding the Iranian nuclear program and more inclined to provide diplomatic cover, notably by rejecting the application of automatic sanctions. The most worrying implication of this shift is that, eventually, Russia might also be more willing to soften its long-established red lines regarding sensitive forms of cooperation. _**The strengthening of military cooperation since 2022, particularly in the fields of drones and missiles, seems to be generating unprecedented dynamics in terms of learning and technological diffusion. How should these transfers be analyzed?**_ **N.G**: I believe these transfers are part of an adaptation process that has progressively transformed the relationship, moving from asymmetry to more marked interdependence. Since 2022, military cooperation has not only intensified but has also generated, on both sides, forms of learning and adjustment that are qualitatively different from previous phases. On the Iranian side, the use of drones and missile systems in Ukraine offers prolonged immersion in a high-end operational environment, including Western-supplied air defense and electronic warfare systems. This generates concrete feedback on performance, survivability, and countermeasures that is difficult to access otherwise. On the Russian side, the integration of Iranian systems has required adjustments in doctrine, logistics, targeting practices, and industrial processes. Over time, this type of interaction creates learning anchored in organizations rather than being limited to individual platforms. What makes this dynamic particularly significant is that it unfolds within previously established institutional networks, notably in Syria. These networks allow for the rapid and informal diffusion of knowledge across military, intelligence, and acquisition spheres. Consequently, cooperation is not limited to _ad hoc_ transfers: the process becomes iterative. Systems adapt, production adjusts, and expectations regarding each party's contributions evolve. It is at this stage that the relationship has undergone more significant transformations. As the war in Ukraine drags on and Russia’s isolation from Western markets and technologies deepens, Moscow’s motivations are changing. Russia has become more dependent on Iran, not only as a supplier of specific systems but also as a partner capable of maintaining military cooperation despite sanctions. This dependence, in turn, increases the likelihood that Russia will be more inclined to share capabilities it previously treated with more caution, notably those related to missile and weaponry technologies. In this sense, learning and adaptation are not simple technical processes; they are also political processes. As cooperation becomes routinized and becomes a necessity, the red lines of the past fade. The relationship moves from a model where Russia carefully calibrates its contribution to Iran to a model where maintaining the partnership itself becomes strategically valuable. This shift is important because it lowers barriers to more advanced forms of cooperation over time, even if these steps happen gradually rather than through a single, radical decision. The broader implication is that we are no longer looking at a simple transactional exchange. Continuous adaptation and reciprocal dependence have begun to lock both parties into a model of cooperation that is harder to reverse and regulate. This is what characterizes the post-2022 phase and explains why its consequences will likely extend beyond drones and missiles, touching on more sensitive areas in the future. **Licence :** `#CC-BY-ND (Attribution, Pas de modification)` ### Thématique `#Géopolitique` **Langue :** `#Anglais` --- ### Navigation pour IA - [Index de tous les contenus](https://conference.sciencespo.fr/llms.txt) - [Plan du site (Sitemap)](https://conference.sciencespo.fr/sitemap.xml) - [Retour à l'accueil](https://conference.sciencespo.fr/)